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ABSTRACT 
Conscrv'ation programs administered by LSDA have traditionally been voluntary, \vith 
t'SDA providing technical and financial assistance to farmers. This tradition is continued in the 
Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996. Cnder these programs, fam1ers 
--:ommit themselves to adopting a land management practice and. in tum. the government 
provides technical and tinancial assistance. Our analysis suggests that these voluntary programs 
are more efficient than a program that mandates adoption if and only if the per acre social cost of 
:,zovemment expenditures under these program is less than the largest per acre farmer loss under 
the mandatory approach plus the additional implementation and enforcement cost. This 
necessary and sufficient condition is likely to be satistied when (a) the deadweight loss from 
raismg the government revenue is zero or small. (b) a large proportion of government serv·ices 1s 
public goods. (c) the area the program targets is large. (d) the price of government serv'ices 1s 
lower than what farmers \vould have to pay for equivalent private services. (e) the maximum per 
acre loss under the mandatory program is large. and (f) the monitoring and enforcement cost is 
much larger for the mandatory program than for the voluntary progran1. 
Ill 
THE RELATIVE EFFICIENCY OF VOLUNTARY VERSUS MAJ~DATORY 
ENVIRON.VIE~TAL REGULATIONS 
The trend of increasing government im·olvement in designing and implementing 
environmental programs in the agricultural sector continues \vith the Federal Agriculture 
l mprovement Act of 1996 (FAIR). The Act reauthorizes Conservation Compliance. the 
c,mservation Reserve Program. and the V/etlands Reserve Program. \vhich were all established 
;n previous farm bills. In addition. FAIR establishes the Environmental Quality Incentives 
Program. FAIR requires the Secretary of Agriculture to implement these programs by providing 
technical and financial assistance to farmers and by entering into contracts with owners and 
operators. It authorizes the Secretary to .. provide technical assistance. cost-share payments. and 
incentive payments to producers ... based on (A) the significance of the soiL water. \vildlife 
habitat. and related natural resource problems in a watershed. multistate area. or region: and I B} 
the structural practices or land management practices that best address the problems. and that 
maximize environmental benetits for each dollar expended. as determined by the Secretary" 
(Subtitle D of Title IlL FAIR). A common characteristic of these Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) programs is that they are voluntary. 
In addition to CSDA involvement. the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
programs also affect agriculhtre. A common characteristic of numerous EPA approaches is that 
:hey are mandatory. Examples include the Clean Water Act. the Clean Air .-\ct. and the Federal 
Insecticides. Fungicides and Rodenticide Act. These acts give EPA authority to ban products 
that pose a threat to human health and to set effluent or emission standards. (v1andatory 
approaches are also widely used to control nutrient and chemical applications in Europe. 
Austria. Germany, Finland. the .\Jetherlands. and Denmark all have regulations governing 
fertilizer and manure applications (A.nderson, DeBossu. and Kuch). Local governments also rely 
on mandatory programs. Olmsted County in Minnesota has developed a mandatory program for 
farmers to adopt erosion-reducing management practices (Helfand and House). And the Central 
Platte Natural Resource District of Nebraska has adopted a set of fertilizer use restrictions to 
protect groundwater quality (Anderson. DeBossu. and Kuch). 
\v ben an industry causes an environmental problem. policymakers must make a choice. 
They can either require the industry to correct the problem. or they can create incentives for the 
industry to correct the problem voluntarily. for example. animal production units often create 
odor problems for rural residents. Politicians feel they have to do something. Should they 
mandate that all livestock farn1ers adopt a potentiully costly management practice that reduces 
udor. or should they enact a voluntary program that educates fam1ers about the practice. and 
entices farmers to adopt the practice with cost-share payments? 
\lost studies on the choice of instruments for ennronmental protection focus on the 
..:omparative advantage of taxes and standards. ' One exception is Stranlund. vvho developed a 
model to compare a mandatory regime vvith a \·oluntary regime in the context of compliance to 
J.n environmental norm. Stranlund assumes that a mandatory program is in place but the 
government is considering the adoption of a voluntary program. A voluntary program dominates 
the mandatory program if it generates the same level of compliance and government revenue but 
higher aggregate utility. Stranlund derives the conditions for a dominant voluntary program to 
exist. However. as Stranlund notes. his welfare analysis cannot be applied to cases in which 
individuals' net benefits are zero or negative. In addition. Stranlund assumes that farmers will 
comply vvith the environmental norn1 when the government provides enough services. so direct 
government payments are not necessary. 
Here. vve extend and generalize Stranlund · s model and compare the efficiency of voluntary 
and mandatory programs to control nonpoint pollution from agriculture. Instead of analyzing 
\vhether a voluntary program dominates a given mandatory program, we evaluate the relative 
efficiency of the two approaches and allow farm benefits to be zero or negative, which implies 
that direct government payments may be needed to induce adoption under the voluntary program. 
The problem we address is that the government vvants farmers to adopt a certain 
management practice on environmentally sensitive land. The government can mandate its 
adoption. with noncompliance punished by a tine or a tax. Or the government can use a 
stewardship program. under which it provides technical assistance and. possibly, cost-share or 
mcentive payments to farmers who adopt the practice. We derive the condition that determines 
\vhich :1pproach involves lower social costs. Satisfaction of this condition depends upon the 
proportion of government services that are public goods. the relative prices of private and public 
efforts to reduce adoption costs, the maximum decrease in profit from adopting the practice 
under the tax. and the deadweight loss of raising government payments. \Ve implicitly assume 
that environmental benefits that accme from adoption of the practice are greater than the social 
costs of adoption. 
The .'\lodel 
Consider a region that has A acres of environmentally sensitive land. These acres are 
loc.ned on S farms. with farm i having a, acres. Let these farms be indexed so that a, ~ a,+ 1 for 
,· = 1 ..... .V-1. Production on these acres is profitable but causes environmental damage. 
Suppose a management practice is available that reduces environmental damage. and adoption 
1mproves social welfare. However. farmers do not voluntarily adopt the practice because it 
would decrease profits. The decrease results from additional equipment costs or from lack of 
experience in implementing the practice. 
Suppose farmers can reduce the decline in profit through their own efforts. For example. 
they might learn how to avoid or minimize yield loss by gathering information about the 
management practice and by learning how it \vorks. Denote the per acre etfort in farm i as e 
The etfort is assumed to be purely private in the sense that it has no etfect on other farmers· 
adoption costs. The etfort is assumed purchased in a competitive market. \vith a unit price of one. 
The government can promote adoption of the management practice by undertaking etlorts 
to reduce adoption costs and by cost sharing. For example. the government can reduce adoption 
cost by gathering and disseminating information about the practice and by providing education 
and training. We group government services into three categories according to the cost of 
providing the services to an additional farm. If the marginal cost of providing a service to an 
additional farm is zero. the service is a pure public good. A typical example of this type of 
program is gathering and disseminating information. On the other hand. if the marginal cost is 
constant. the service is a pure private good. A typical example of this type of program is cost 
sharing. Finally. if the marginal cost is greater than zero but decreasing, the service is a semi-
3 
public good. An example of this type of program would be technical assistance. Although it is 
costly to provide technical assistance to an additional farm. the cost may be decreasing because 
the necessary techniques have been developed. \V e refer to all government payments and pure 
private services as cost sharing and the remainder as services. 
Assume that the government does not distinguish betv,:een individual fanners. but instead 
provides the same level of services per acre to fanners who adopt the management practice. 
Denote the le\ el of government services per acre as g and the total provision of government 
services as G. Then G = ug. vvhere u is a parameter indicating the ··publicness·· of government 
services. If all government services are pure public goods. then u = 1: if all government 
~ef\ ices are pure private goods. then u = .-i *. \vhere A* is the total acreage of land that adopts 
the practice. In generaL l < u< A*. Letp be the price of the government services. Then the 
tl1tal cost of government services is pug. 
Let c. be the per acre loss (the decrease in profit) on farm i after adopting the management 
practice. This loss depends upon both farm i 's ovm efforts and the level of government sef\'ices . 
. -\ssume that individual efforts and government sef\'ices are perfect substitutes and the loss 
function takes a quadratic form: 
( 1 ) l . c, = c(x,.a,) = a,1 - j]a,- a 1.\-'- 1 a 2x,-. 
vvhere x 1 = e, + g. and cx0 , ext, a. 2 , and ~ are parameters. The loss function is assumed to be 
decreasing, convey and twice differentiable in x, . That is, cc, ex, ::::; 0 and c--2 c, i'x_c. 2 0. 
These assumptions imply that a 1 2 0. and a, 2 0. Given x. the cost function can be increasing 
or Jecreasing in a .. So. f3 can be positive or negative. For example. the same equipment may 
be needed to pwctice no-till \Vhether a farmer is farming 500 acres or 1000 acres. This type of 
economy of scale tends to make f3 negative. On the other hand. no-till farming requires timely 
weed management. Small farms can often do better in this regard than large farms. This type of 
diseconomy of scale tends to make ~ positive. OveralL if there are economies of scale in 
adopting the practice. ~ will be negative: otherwise. ~ will be positive. 
Suppose the government wants to see adoption ofthe management practice on all 
environmentally sensitive land in the region and is considering two alternative measures to 
achieve this environmental objective. Under the first measure. adoption is mandatory. The 
government provides no service to reduce c, . but instead imposes a fine or a tax on nonadopters . 
. -\ssume that detection of nonadopters is certain. but there vvill be some monitoring and 
implementation costs. Under the second measure. adoption is voluntary and is promoted through 
a stewardship program. under vvhich the government not only undertakes efforts to reduce c1 but 
also makes payments to farmers vvho adopt the practice. The pertinent question is. which 
measure is more efficient at achieving the government's objective? Before we try to answer this 
question. it is necessary to determine hmv farmers might respond to these two measures. 
Farmers' Decisions under the Jfandatory Program 
Under a mandatory program. the government takes no action to reduce the adoption costs. 
but instead imposes a fine or a tax of t dollars per acre on nonadopters. For simplicity. assume 
that if a farmer chooses to adopt the practice. it vvill be adopted on all vulnerable land. Let cr1 be 
a dichotomous variable indicating farmer i 's adoption decision: a-, = 1 if farmer i adopts the 
practice and a-, = 0 otherwise. Let JT
1 
be the per acre net return in farm i before adopting the 
practice on vulnerable land. Then farn1er ( s decision problem under the regulatory measure is 
(:2) max 71: 1 - u 1c(e1.aJ- e1 - (1- cr1)t. 
() .2, 
Note first that farmers \Vho do not adopt the management practice have no incentive to reduce 
adoption cost. Thus. if 0'1 = 0. e1 = 0. In this case. farmer i' s per acre. after-tax net return is 
( ;;: 1 - 1:). Farmers who decide to adopt the management practice would like to minimize the 
adoption cost. Thus. given that cr, = 1. the farmer's problem becomes min c( e1.az)_;_ e1 • The 
first-order condition for this minimization problem is 
\Vhere e, is the optimal per acre etiort on farm i under the tax. The left-hand side of (3) is the 
marginal benetit of the effort in farm i (i.e .. the reduction in loss), and the right-hand side is the 
price of the effort. Thus. at the optimal level of etiort marginal cost equals marginal benefit 
using ( 1 ), ( 3) becomes 
5 
(-+) 
Thus. on a per acre basis. each fmmer devotes the same amount of effort to reduce adoption cost. 
Substituting(-+) back into (1 ). we get the per acre adoption cost for farm i: 
I 5 l 
. • r ·. (af -1) 
C . - ·( e · ) - a f3a ' , = C .U, - 'l-:- , - . 
· ·. · · ·. · 2a, 
Thus. if farm i adopts the practice. its per acre decrease in profit under the tax vvill be 
i6) 
F~1m1 i vvill adopt the practice if and only if this loss is less than the tax rate. i.e .. 
f f there are overall economies of scale in adopting the management practice. then ~ < 0. and loss 
under the tax L decreases as farm size increases. Given a tax rate. large farms will be more 
I ~ 
likely to adopt the practice. If there are diseconomies of scale in adopting the practice. then the 
loss under the tax vvill increase vvith farm size and small farms vvill be more likely to adopt the 
Jesired management practice. 
Expression (7) indicates that all fam1ers adopt the practice when the tax rate is set high 
enough. Thus. under the mandatory program. the minimum social cost of achieving the 
government's environmental objective equals 
where R. is the monitoring and implementation cost of the mandatory program. 
Farmers' Decisions under the Voluntary Program 
Under the voluntary program. adoption of the practice is promoted through a stewardship 
program. under which the government not only provides services to farmers but also shares 
adoption costs by providing direct payments. Lets be the per acre government payment to 
farmers who adopt the management practice. Then farmer i ·s decision problem under this 
program 1s 
6 
( 9) max TC 1- uic( e: + g, a1 )- e, + u 1s. 
G,. t! 
Again. fanners who do not adopt the management practice have no incentive to try to reduce the 
:1doption cost. Thus. if u, = 0, e, = 0. In this case. farmer i 's per acre net return is ,7, . On the 
other hand. farmers who adopt the management practice will seek to minimize the cost of doing 
so. Thus. giwn u, = l. farmer i 's objective is to 
(l 0) mm c( e1 -c- (Y u:)- e z ~ (_':) ~ 
c 
s.t. e > l~ 0. 
The first-order condition for this minimization problem is 
\vhere e is the etlort in farm i under the voluntary program. Note that the optimal effort under 
c == c( e' -'-g. a,). Then. c'' = C: if g < e1 • and ( = c(g,a,)::; c( e' .a,)= C: if g :=:: C1 • That 1s. if 
the government provides fewer services than w·hat farmer i \vould like to purchase under the tax. 
farn1er i will make up the difference. However. if the government provides more services than 
what farmer i \vould like to purchase under the tax. farmer i will make no etlort. In this case. the 
adoption cost is lovver under the voluntary program than under the tax. 
"low consider farmers' adoption decisions under the voluntary program. If the government 
provides fevver services than what tam1er i vvould purchase under the tax. its per acre net return 
would be .7, - c: - ( e1 -g)- s if it adopts. Thus. tarmer i will adopt the management practice if 
and only if 
or 
( 13) 
..,. -cJ-(ec- a)-'- y> ITt 
,..., { ~ c"J , ._ -
>Lt-a S- I 0' 
where L'- g is the per acre loss under the voluntary program. Thus, farmer i will adopt the 
practice if and only if the payment rate is greater than the loss . 
.., 
I 
If there are economies of scale in adopting the management practice. the L: decreases as 
farm size increases. Given the level of government effort and the payment rate. large farms will 
be more likely to adopt the management practice. Thus. if s 2: L\- g. then s 2: (- g for i = 1 . 
.... S. That is. if the smallest farm in the region adopts the management practice. all farms \Vill 
do so. On the other hand. if there are diseconomies of scale in adopting the management 
oractice. then D increases with farm size. and smaller farms \Vill be more likelv to adoot the ~ I "' ~ 
practice. Thus. if s 2: L\- g. then s 2: L~- g for i = 1 ..... .V. 
""ow. consider the case in which the government provides more services than what farmer i 
\\Ould purchase under the tax (i.e .. g 2: t:?. ). In this case, farmer i makes no etlort to reduce the 
adoption cost. The per acre payment farmer i receive for adopting the management practice is s . 
\vhereas the per acre loss is c( g. a,) . Thus. farmer i will adopt the practice if and only if 
( 1-+l 
The Optimal Levels of Government Services and Payment Rates 
Given farmers· response to the voluntary program. the government's objective is to choose 
the appropriate level of :services and payment rate to minimize the social cost of achieving its 
environmental objective. The loss in per acre net return in farm i after adopting the management 
practice is ( c 1v-'- e1v- s). Total government expenditure under the voluntary program is 
1 . ..J.s~ pug). Let ;_ be the marginal deadweight loss from distortionary taxes needed to raise 
go\·ernment revenue. Then the social cost of the government expenditure is { 1 + /.){As-:- pug). 
Thus. under the voluntary program. the government's objective can be formally stated as 
I ])) mm 
g, s 
s.t. 
where o = 1 if there are economies of scale in adopting the management practice. and 8 = V if 
there are diseconomies of scale in adopting the practice. Thus, when constraint ( 16) is satisfied. 
all farmers in the region adopt the practice. 
8 
To solve this minimization problem. recall that if g..:::; e1 , (' = ci and eiv = e' - g , and if 
g > er, c.' = c( g. a,) and e,' = 0. Assume for the moment that g..:::; e' . In this case. ( 15) and ( 16) 
become 
.\ 
( 17) mm Ia1 L~-,- 1~-ls_,.. (1-,- /.)pu- .-1. g 
g, s := l 
( 1 8) S. t. 5 + g ~ L:,. . 
\rote that as long as s+ g ~ L~. all farms in the region \vill adopt the practice. Thus, increasing s 
,)r g is equally effective in promoting adoption. The government would like to increase the 
rammcter that causes the smaller deadv;eight loss. The marginal dc:adv,:eight loss of increasing s 
lS c:( 1~-J.s) CS= tv{, whereas the marginal deadv.-eight [OSS of increasing g is 
'" i 1- /.)pug- Ag cg = 0 + !~) pu- A. where (1 + I~) pug is the social cost of government 
services, and Ag is the sa\·ing in private efforts. c (1 _,.. i.) pug- Ag c'g > c( !As) cs if and only 
tf (1..;.. l.)pu- A> !A or pu> .-!.. 
This result suggest that given g..::; e1 • if pu> .-1, the government \vill choose g 1 = 0 and 
s1 = L~5 to achieve its environmental objective. Substituting these results into ( 17) gives the 
social cost of the voluntary· program 
(19) 
.\ SC~= 'Ia~L~+ IAL15..;.. Rv, 
:=I 
where R, is the implementation cost of the voluntary program. Because the regulatory· program 
1s likely to incur a lower enforcement cost than the voluntary· program. we assume Rv < R, . 
where R. is the monitoring and implementation cost ofthe regulatory· program. Because in this 
case the government does not provide any service, but instead provides a direct payment of L5 
per acre. total government expenditure is 
Given g..:::; e·. if pu< A, the marginal deadweight loss of increasing g will be smaller than the 
marginal deadweight loss of increasing s. Thus, given g..:::; e1 • the optimal levels of government 
9 
services and payment rate will be g2 = e
1 
and s2 = L6- g. Substitute the results into (17). \Ve 
get the social cost of the voluntary program 
v 
SC,__2 = I aiL~-':- lA( L6- / )+ [(l + i.) pu- .-:1 ]e 1 -l- Rv 
r=l 
·'\nd total government expenditure is 
::2:=.1 £2 = . ..JCL6- /)+ puet 
Flmlly. if pu= .--!. it does not matter \vhether the government or farn1ers make the effort. In this 
...:ase. the total cost of the voluntary program is sc~ = sc!;. 
'\ow. consider the case of g> e1 . )Jote first that it \vill never be socially optimal for 
government to provide services if government has to pay a higher price than farmers. Thus. only 
when pu< . .J.. g> /. Recall that given g> /. c:~ = c(g.a1 ) and,/= 0. Substitute this resuit 
into ( 15), \Ve get 
y 
(23) rnm '2...a1 c(g.ai)- s + (1..,- A-)(sA+ pug), 
'?· s r= 1 
I 24) s.t. 
Since it is costly to raise government expenditures. the s- c( g, a8 ) 2': 0 constraint must be 
binding at the optimum solution. \Vhen we substitute s = c( g, a 8 ) into (23) and differentiate the 
result \Vith respect tog, vve get the first-order condition for the minimization problem: 
.\' 
Ia,c1(g,ai)+ f,Ac 1(g,a0 )+ 11.,... A.lpu= 0. 
r=l 
Substituting ( 1) into (25) and solving for g, we obtain 
126) 
Comparing 1 26) \vith ( 4) indicates that when pu < A. \Ve indeed have g3 > / . Thus. 
government provides more services than what a farmer would purchase if and only if the per acre 
10 
cost of government services is less than the price farmers would have to pay. In this case, the 
government payment is 
(27} 
The change in per acre net return in farm i is 
( 28) 
The total government expenditure under the voluntary program equals 
,2')) 
Substituting these results into (14). \Ve obtain the social cost ofthe voluntary program 
\ 
,:'-()) sc:, = ~ a;L~·- ( 1-'- A.)£*+ R, 
i=l 
In summary, if pu> A. the government should not provide any service. but instead 
provide a direct payment of s1 = L~ per acre. In this case. the minimum social cost of the 
voluntary program is sc:. = SC,~. and the optimal government expenditure is £*= AL~. On the 
other hand. if pu< A. the level of services government provides could be g2 or go. If the level 
of services the government provides is g 2 • the total social cost of the voluntary program will be 
given by equation (21); if the level of services the government provides is g3 • the total social 
cost of the voluntary program \vill be given by equation (28). To determine which level of 
services the government should provide when pu< A. we compare equation (21) with equation 
( 28): 
I 311 
Since the social cost of the voluntary program is always smaller \vhen the lev-el of services is g 3 • 
the optimal level of government services is g,. Thus. when pu< A. the minimum social cost of 
1 l 
the voluntary program is sc~ = sc2' and the optimal level of government expenditure is 
E* = £ 3. Finally. if pu= .-1. SC~ = sc; = sc:. In this case. it does not matter whether the 
government or farmers make the effort to reduce adoption cost. 
Relative Efficiency 
In this section. we evaluate the relative efficiency of the two programs we have described. 
A program is said to be more efficient if it can be used to achieve the government's 
environmental objective at a lower social cost. Proposition 1 provides the condition that 
Jetermines the relative efficiency of the tvvo programs. 
Proposition 1. The voluntary program is more efficient than the mandatory program 
ifand only if 
>t·here 6 = 1 zfthere are economies o(scale in adopting the management practice, 6 = Y it chen: 
are diseconomies of scale in adopting the practice. and 0.R = R1 - Rv is the dUference in 
enji)rcement costs under rhe t\+'0 programs. 
Before proving this proposition. it is useful to interpret ( 32). If there are economies of 
scale in adopting the management practice. farm 1. the smallest farm in the region. will suffer 
from the largest loss per acre under the tax. On the other hand, if there are diseconomies of scale 
in adopting the management practice. farmS. the largest farm in the region, will suffer from the 
largest loss per acre under the tax. Thus. L~5 is the largest loss among all farms in the region 
under the tax. Proposition 1 reveals that the voluntary program \Vill be more efficient if and only 
if the per acre social cost of government expenditure under the voluntary program is less than the 
largest loss under the regulatory program plus the additional implementation cost of the 
regulatory program. 
12 
Proof: First, consider the case of pu< A. In this case. the social cost of the voluntary 
program is sc: = sc;. The social cost of the regulatory program is always given by equation 
( 8 ). Thus. the difference bet\veen the social costs of the two programs equals 
\ 
( ""'""'\ C"'i-, .. C('* '\ li L\.·~ ,\R 1 ')£* 
.J.'I ~-)<--;-~),.=.:....a,( ·i- !)+,_..-(+I .. 
:=I 
Substituting (6) and (28) into (33) 
L 
Thus. sc;- sc: > 0 if and only if condition (32) holds. 
\.'ovv. consider the case of pu2 .-1. In this case, the social cost of the voluntary program is 
SC,~ = SC.~,. and the optimal government expenditure is £* = AL6. By using equations ( 8) and 
( 19). vve obtain the difference between the social costs of the two programs: 
( 35) sc;- SC,: = ,:.'.R- A.AL6 
= AL6+,:.\.R-(l-'- .A)£* . 
. -\gain. sc*- sc:. > 0 if and only if condition ( 32) holds. 
Condition (32) is useful because in order to check whether it is satistied, we only need to 
calculate the decrease in protits on the farm that has the most difficulty in adopting the 
management practice. instead of calculating loss in every farm of the region. The condition 
emphasizes the loss for the least profitable farm because it is the loss for this farm that 
determines the per acre government payment under the voluntary program. 
l3 
To see when condition (32) is likely to be satisfied. we analyze some special cases. 
Corollary l evaluates the relatiw efficiency of the two programs \Vhen there is no deadweight 
cost of raising government expenditure. Corollary 2 examines the case in which all government 
services are purely public goods and the loss from adopting the management practice can be 
reduced to zero by private or public efforts. Finally. in corollary 3. we investigate the case in 
which all government services are purely private goods and the government cannot purchase 
these ser:ices at a lower price than farmers. 
Corollary 1. When 1.= 0. the mandarory program cannot he more efficient than the 
voluntary program. 
Proof First. consider the case of pu< .cl. In this case. the optimal government 
expenditure is given by equation (29). Suostitute L:s from (6) and£* from (29) into (34) and 
( 36) 
' 
::: Cf."J 
( cJ. 1 - 1 r-:- _-..,_ R 
""Jote that \Vhen pu< A. g3 > e
1
. This result suggests that given A= 0. when the government 
can provide the services at a 10\ver price than farmers (i.e .. p < 1) and some of the services are 
public foods (i.e .. u< A), the voluntary program will be more efficient than the regulatory 
program. 
~O\V. consider pu?. A. In this case. the difference betvveen the social costs of the two 
programs is given by equation (35). Substitute /,= 0 into (35), 
( 371 sc;- sc: = 0.R?. o. 
In this case. the mandatory program cannot be more efficient than the voluntary program because 
it incurs at least the same eniorcement cost as the voluntary program. 
The intuition behind Corollary 1 is straightforward. \Vhen pu< A, government services 
either avoid duplicated private efforts or cost less (p < 1 ). As a result, the optimal level of 
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government service \vill be higher than C 1 under the voluntary program. For the first pue 1 dollars 
the government spends on services. farmers save Ae,1 • Under the mandatory program. farmers 
\Vill devote Ae 1 dollars to cost reduction. Because pue 1 < A/. social \Velfare improves under 
the voluntary program. In addition. because the government can reduce the adoption cost at a 
lO\ver cost than farmers. it will devote more effort to cost reduction than each individual farmer 
under the regulatory program. This \vill further improve social welfare. 
When pu?:_ .-1. the government will not provide any service .. -\s a result farmers will make 
the same etTort under the t\VO programs. The only difference bet\veen these two programs is that 
che mandatory program forces farmers to adopt the management practice by penalty. \Vhereas the 
voluntary program induces farmers to adopt through direct payments. Because government 
payments do not cause any deadweight loss \Yhile the regulatory program incurs a larger 
enforcement cost the voluntary program is more efficient. 
Corollary 2. if pu A ---)-0 as A -)-:O and the loss in the least advantaReousfarm can he 
reduced ro :::era h_v private and public efforts. rhen rhe voluntary program ·will he more ejficienl 
than the mandatory program when the total acreage oj'environmentally sensitive land is large 
enough. 
Proof: V/hen pu< A. the optimal government expenditure£* is given by equation i 29). 
Substitute£* into (34) and rearrange terms. 
( 38) 
+ 0.R. 
"iote that the tirst term on the right-hand side of (38) approaches+ r:o as A -)-r:o. Also. as 
(39) 
'hhich is the minimum of c( a6, x). The assumption that the loss for the least profitable farm can 
be reduced to zero implies that the minimum is negative or zero. If it is negative. then the second 
15 
term on the right-hand side of (3 8) approaches +cc as A -----YXJ. If it is zero. then by L' Hospital's 
rule= (Chiang, p. 429), we obtain 
I 
l ( puf (40) lim .-11 a 0 + ~as- al-
1--->:0 ' :?.a, .-1 
-
1 ( al- ' ao+ ~a~- pu:-
" .2a: \, A ) lim 
.1----4-f:; 1 
A 
1 ( pu]( _ pu J 
- ! a!-
.1 A ."1 2 lim a;_ \ cx 1pu = 
1-+.C 1 a, 
-
' 
.-1"'" 
Tn this case. the second term on the right-hand side of(38) approaches a finite number. Because 
the first term on the right-hand side of (38) approaches+ JJ and the second term approaches 
either+ JJ or a finite number, sc;- sc: becomes positive as .-1 becomes large enough. This 
show·s that the voluntary program will be more efficient when the total acreage of 
environmentally sensitive land is large enough. 
Cnder what circumstances will the assumptions in Corollary 2 be satisfied? First. 
pu .-1-j-0 when all government services are pure public goods. In this case, u= 1. In fact. as 
long as u is a limited number or increases at a slower rate than A, pu A -j-0. This case may 
occur when there are different types of farms and the government has to provide technical 
information for each type of farm. Second. loss from adopting the management practice can be 
reduced to zero if the loss results from a lack of information or experience. The intuition behind 
Corollary 2 is that, as total acreage of environmentally sensitive land becomes larger, 
government services will avoid more and more duplicated private efforts. The benefits of 
government services will eventually outweigh their costs because the marginal cost of providing 
sen·ices is declining. 
Corollary 3. When pu= A, the mandatory program is more efficient than the voluntary 
pror;;ram ifand only if 
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( 41) 
Proof \Vhen pu= A. E*= AL6. Substituting the result into (.32) gives (41). 
Corollary 3 reveals that when all government services are purely private and the 
government cannot provide them at a lov,:er cost than farmers. then the mandator;.: program is 
more efficient if and only if the additional enforcement cost of the mandatory program is less 
than the dead\veight loss of government expenditure under the voluntary program. \\/hen 
pu = .-1. E* = E1 = L_ = E3 = AL:,. This suggests that when pu =A. the total government 
expenditure will be the same whether the government provides the services or fanners 
~hemselves make the effort to reduce the adoption cost. \\/hen the government provides more 
ser. ices to reduce the adoption cost. it will save farmers· efforts. As a result. direct payments 
can be reduced. 
Concluding Remarks 
Conservation programs administered by USDA have traditionally been voluntary. \Vith 
l;SDA providing technical and tinancial assistance to farmers. ll1is tradition is continued in the 
Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996. Under these programs. farmers 
commit themselves to adopting a land management practice and. in tum. the government 
provides technical and financial assistance. Our analysis suggests that these voluntary programs 
are more efficient than a program that mandates adoption if and only if the per acre social cost of 
government expenditures under these program is less than the largest per acre farmer loss under 
the mandator;.· approach plus additional implementation and enforcement cost. This necessary 
and sufficient condition is likely to be satisfied \Vhen (a) the deadweight loss from raising the 
government revenue is zero or smalL (b) a large proportion of government services are public 
goods. (c) the price of government services is lower than what farmers would have to pay for 
equivalent private services. (d) the maximum per acre loss under the mandatory program is large. 
and (e) the monitoring and enforcement cost is much larger for the mandatory program than for 
the voluntary program. 
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These findings suggest that voluntary programs are most efficient when the technical 
assistance the government provides are public goods and the area the program targets is large. 
These are the characteristics of many soil conservation programs where farmers commit 
themselves to a land management practice. such as leaving crop residue on the soil to reduce soil 
erosion. and in return the government provides technical and financial assistance. The technical 
assistance is largely information about hovY the management practice works and hovv it can be 
used to provide economic and environmental benefits. There may be some costs associated \Vith 
providing the technical assistance to additional farmers. but the costs are very low. In the case of 
"lli 1 management practices. many farmers tind that pro tits are largely unchanged after CJ.doption. 
lhese farmers vvould have suffered a larger loss under a mandatory program .. 
l8 
ENDNOTES 
l. rhe literature on instrument choice has covered the comparative advantage of taxes and 
standards under uncertainty (e.g .. \Veitm1an: ..\dar and Griffin). enforcement issues (e.g .. 
Harford: Harrington: Russell). as \vell as other dimensions for judging policy instruments 
1 e.g .. Bohm and Russell: Dewees). These issues are typically discussed in the context of point 
source of pollution. In the context of nonpoint source pollution. Griffin and Bromley and 
Shortie and Dunn analvzed cost effectiveness of incentives and standards that are applied to 
agricultural runoff or management practice. Other studies (e.g .. Helfand and House: and 
Johnson, Adams, and Perry.) examined the effects of input use tax and standards on farm 
income and groundwater quality. 
"' L · Hospital's rule states that \Vhen lim f ( x) = lim g( x) = 0. lim f ( x) g( x) 
t~·:J2 (-+YJ t---+ct.J 
= limf'(x) g'(x). 
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